### 1

#### Trade promotion authority will pass – bipartisan support

Reuters 12-12 – (“Congress could OK trade promotion bill in early 2014”, December 12 of 2013, http://www.agprofessional.com/news/Congress-could-OK-trade-promotion-bill-in-early-2014-235387181.html)

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - Three top U.S. lawmakers on key congressional committees have reached a bipartisan deal on legislation the White House needs to advance international trade agreements and will introduce the measure early next month, congressional aides said on Saturday. The Trade Promotion Authority legislation, which would let the White House put trade agreements before Congress for an up or down vote without amendments, is considered crucial to enacting trade deals and could pave the way for major accords with Pacific Rim and European trading partners. The agreement was reached among Max Baucus, a Democrat who chairs the Senate Finance Committee which has jurisdiction over trade, the committee's senior Republican, Orrin Hatch, and Representative Dave Camp, the Republican chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, which is also oversees trade issues.

#### Plan saps PC

Leising, Berkley journalism graduate school, No date

[Matt, “EL PASO: NADBANK”, <http://journalism.berkeley.edu/projects/border/elpasonadbank.html>, accessed 7/15, CC]

That bank is the North American Development Bank (NADBank). Along with its sister institution, the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), headquartered in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, NADBank was created under intense political pressure and maneuvering in 1993 when the Clinton Administration was pushing through its plan for NAFTA. To muster enough votes to pass the treaty, which was originally negotiated under the Bush Administration, President Clinton had to not only convince Republicans to side with a president they clearly did not trust, but also had to persuade the historically pro-labor and environmenally conscious Democrats in Congress that the treaty wouldn't drain American manufacturing jobs and ruin the environment in the process . In the end, Clinton succeeded, even surpassing the number of votes needed by 34, when NAFTA - along with an environmental and labor side agreement - was passed on November 17, 1993 .

#### Political capital is essential for TPA, which maintains US trade leadership

Riley and Kim, 13 (Bryan, Jay Van Andel senior policy analyst in trade policy for the Center for International Trade and Economics, and Anthony, senior policy analyst Center for International Trade and Economics, “Advancing Trade Freedom: Key Objective of Trade Promotion Authority Renewal,” http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/04/advancing-trade-freedom-key-objective-of-trade-promotion-authority-renewal)

Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) has been a critical tool for advancing free trade and spreading its benefits to a greater number of Americans. TPA, also known as “fast track” authority, is the legislative power Congress grants to the President to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. Provided the President observes certain statutory obligations under TPA, Congress agrees to consider implementing those trade pacts without amending them. More than a decade has passed since TPA was last renewed in 2002, and its authority expired in 2007. Reinstituting TPA may well be the most important legislative action on trade for both Congress and the President in 2013 given the urgency of restoring America’s credibility in advancing open markets and securing greater benefits of two-way trade for Americans. As the case for timely reinstallation of an effective and practical TPA is stronger than ever, the quest for renewing TPA should be guided by principles that enhance trade freedom, a vital component of America’s economic freedom. Emerging TPA Renewal Debates Both House Ways and Means Committee chairman David Camp (R–MI) and Senate Finance Committee chairman Max Baucus (D–MT) have announced plans to pursue TPA legislation. However, many lawmakers have correctly pointed out that a proactive push from President Obama is critical, given that trade bills have been a thorny issue for many Democrats in recent years. Historically, it has been common practice, although not formally required, to have the President request that Congress provide renewed TPA. In fact, except for President Obama, every President since Franklin Roosevelt has either requested or received trade negotiating authority.[1] After four years of informing Congress it would seek TPA at “the appropriate time,” early this year the Obama Administration finally indicated its interest in working with Congress to get TPA done. The President’s 2013 trade agenda offered the Administration’s most forward-leaning language yet, specifying that “to facilitate the conclusion, approval, and implementation of market-opening negotiating efforts, we will also work with Congress on Trade Promotion Authority.”[2] In the 2002 Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act, Congress—whose role in formulating U.S. trade policy includes defining trade negotiation objectives—made it clear that [t]he expansion of international trade is vital to the national security of the United States. Trade is critical to the economic growth and strength of the United States and to its leadership in the world. Stable trading relationships promote security and prosperity.… Leadership by the United States in international trade fosters open markets, democracy, and peace throughout the world.[3] Foster Trade Liberalization, Not Protectionism The Obama Administration often seems to regard trade as a zero-sum game of capturing value that would otherwise go elsewhere. However, trade liberalization is about creating and adding value, capitalizing on competitive advantages, and further harnessing the power of freedom and choice. Trade has been an integral part of America’s extraordinary economic progress over the past decades. Since 1929, trade volume has increased from less than 9 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) to around 30 percent, while real U.S. GDP per person increased from $8,000 to more than $43,000. This progress faces continuing threats, mainly from special-interest groups that malign free trade in an attempt to seek protection from competition at the expense of everyone else. Some lawmakers have even viewed TPA legislation as a vehicle to address the perceived costs of free trade for the U.S. economy. However, using TPA renewal to redress the suspected costs of trade is an ill-advised idea. TPA is an instrument that not only enables America to secure increased access to overseas markets but also provides the unique opportunity for the U.S. to reduce its own barriers and advance economic freedom. Congress and the President can help the American economy by removing barriers that limit its competitiveness. With open trade and investment ensured, the interplay of low tax rates and efficient regulations could effectively enhance America’s economic freedom. Entangling TPA with a protectionist agenda, on the other hand, would not serve America’s interests in the global market. Imports Do Support American Jobs The TPA renewal debate in Congress should reflect the fact that both exports and imports are job-supporting activities. In other words, the debate should focus on how to deliver greater trade freedom to Americans that advances the benefits of trade in both directions. It is a common misperception that importing goods to America comes at the cost of American jobs. In fact, imports contribute to job creation on a large scale. The increased economic activity associated with every stage of the import process helps support millions of jobs in the U.S. As shown by a recent Heritage Foundation study, for instance, over half a million American jobs—in fields such as transportation, wholesale, retail, construction, and finance—are supported by imports of clothes and toys from China alone.[4] Highlighting the dynamic and value-adding role played by imports in the U.S. economy, an empirical analysis published in the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review presents strong evidence that “policies to bolster exports at the expense of imports would significantly harm U.S. manufacturing,” adding that “imports have played a critical positive role in boosting manufacturing output in the United States—much more so, in fact, than exports.”[5] Indeed, intermediate goods imports and capital goods imports are the lifeblood of U.S. manufacturing. Without them, manufacturing output is impossible. What Congress Should Do in Reauthorizing TPA While working constructively with the Obama Administration, Congress should: Grant long-term (at least five years or even permanent) renewal of TPA so that America’s credibility in pursuing free trade can be effectively restored; Insist on negotiating parameters that promote actual increases in international trade flows and guarantee reductions in tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and investment; Oppose any emphasis in TPA legislation on the promotion of exports over imports in recognition of the importance of both in increasing American jobs and prosperity; and Resist imposing any special sectoral or industry-specific requirements on negotiators, including in areas such as environmental and labor standards. A Unique Opportunity The threat to U.S. prosperity comes not from free trade but from the decline in economic freedom. In the process of working on TPA reauthorization, Congress has the unique opportunity to become an effective advocate for advancing economic freedom and help America reap the rewards that accrue from such policies. It should not let the opportunity pass.

#### **Collapse of trade causes great power war and US economic decline *in the short term***

PANITCHPAKDI ‘4 (Supachai Panitchpakdi, secretary-general of the UN Conference on Trade and Development, 2/26/2004, American Leadership and the World Trade Organization, p. http://www.wto.org/english/news\_e/spsp\_e/spsp22\_e.htm)

The second point is that strengthening the world trading system is essential to America's wider global objectives. Fighting terrorism, reducing poverty, improving health, integrating China and other countries in the global economy — all of these issues are linked, in one way or another, to world trade. This is not to say that trade is the answer to all America's economic concerns; only that meaningful solutions are inconceivable without it. The world trading system is the linchpin of today's global order — underpinning its security as well as its prosperity. A successful WTO is an example of how multilateralism can work. Conversely, if it weakens or fails, much else could fail with it. This is something which the US — at the epicentre of a more interdependent world — cannot afford to ignore. These priorities must continue to guide US policy — as they have done since the Second World War. America has been the main driving force behind eight rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, including the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and the creation of the WTO. The US — together with the EU — was instrumental in launching the latest Doha Round two years ago. Likewise, the recent initiative, spearheaded by Ambassador Zoellick, to re-energize the negotiations and move them towards a successful conclusion is yet another example of how essential the US is to the multilateral process — signalling that the US remains committed to further liberalization, that the Round is moving, and that other countries have a tangible reason to get on board. The reality is this: when the US leads the system can move forward; when it withdraws, the system drifts. The fact that US leadership is essential, does not mean it is easy. As WTO rules have expanded, so too has as the complexity of the issues the WTO deals with — everything from agriculture and accounting, to tariffs and telecommunication. The WTO is also exerting huge gravitational pull on countries to join — and participate actively — in the system. The WTO now has 146 Members — up from just 23 in 1947 — and this could easily rise to 170 or more within a decade. Emerging powers like China, Brazil, and India rightly demand a greater say in an institution in which they have a growing stake. So too do a rising number of voices outside the system as well. More and more people recognize that the WTO matters. More non-state actors — businesses, unions, environmentalists, development NGOs — want the multilateral system to reflect their causes and concerns. A decade ago, few people had even heard of the GATT. Today the WTO is front page news. A more visible WTO has inevitably become a more politicized WTO. The sound and fury surrounding the WTO's recent Ministerial Meeting in Cancun — let alone Seattle — underline how challenging managing the WTO can be. But these challenges can be exaggerated. They exist precisely because so many countries have embraced a common vision. Countries the world over have turned to open trade — and a rules-based system — as the key to their growth and development. They agreed to the Doha Round because they believed their interests lay in freer trade, stronger rules, a more effective WTO. Even in Cancun the great debate was whether the multilateral trading system was moving fast and far enough — not whether it should be rolled back. Indeed, it is critically important that we draw the right conclusions from Cancun — which are only now becoming clearer. The disappointment was that ministers were unable to reach agreement. The achievement was that they exposed the risks of failure, highlighted the need for North-South collaboration, and — after a period of introspection — acknowledged the inescapable logic of negotiation. Cancun showed that, if the challenges have increased, it is because the stakes are higher. The bigger challenge to American leadership comes from inside — not outside — the United States. In America's current debate about trade, jobs and globalization we have heard a lot about the costs of liberalization. We need to hear more about the opportunities. We need to be reminded of the advantages of America's openness and its trade with the world — about the economic growth tied to exports; the inflation-fighting role of imports, the innovative stimulus of global competition. We need to explain that freer trade works precisely because it involves positive change — better products, better job opportunities, better ways of doing things, better standards of living. While it is true that change can be threatening for people and societies, it is equally true that the vulnerable are not helped by resisting change — by putting up barriers and shutting out competition. They are helped by training, education, new and better opportunities that — with the right support policies — can flow from a globalized economy. The fact is that for every job in the US threatened by imports there is a growing number of high-paid, high skill jobs created by exports. Exports supported 7 million workers a decade ago; that number is approaching around 12 million today. And these new jobs — in aerospace, finance, information technology — pay 10 per cent more than the average American wage. We especially need to inject some clarity — and facts — into the current debate over the outsourcing of services jobs. Over the next decade, the US is projected to create an average of more than 2 million new services jobs a year — compared to roughly 200,000 services jobs that will be outsourced. I am well aware that this issue is the source of much anxiety in America today. Many Americans worry about the potential job losses that might arise from foreign competition in services sectors. But it’s worth remembering that concerns about the impact of foreign competition are not new. Many of the reservations people are expressing today are echoes of what we heard in the 1970s and 1980s. But people at that time didn’t fully appreciate the power of American ingenuity. Remarkable advances in technology and productivity laid the foundation for unprecedented job creation in the 1990s and there is no reason to doubt that this country, which has shown time and again such remarkable potential for competing in the global economy, will not soon embark again on such a burst of job-creation. America's openness to service-sector trade — combined with the high skills of its workforce — will lead to more growth, stronger industries, and a shift towards higher value-added, higher-paying employment. Conversely, closing the door to service trade is a strategy for killing jobs, not saving them. Americans have never run from a challenge and have never been defeatist in the face of strong competition. Part of this challenge is to create the conditions for global growth and job creation here and around the world. I believe Americans realize what is at stake. The process of opening to global trade can be disruptive, but they recognize that the US economy cannot grow and prosper any other way. They recognize the importance of finding global solutions to shared global problems. Besides, what is the alternative to the WTO? Some argue that the world's only superpower need not be tied down by the constraints of the multilateral system. They claim that US sovereignty is compromised by international rules, and that multilateral institutions limit rather than expand US influence. Americans should be deeply sceptical about these claims. Almost none of the trade issues facing the US today are any easier to solve unilaterally, bilaterally or regionally. The reality is probably just the opposite. What sense does it make — for example — to negotiate e-commerce rules bilaterally? Who would be interested in disciplining agricultural subsidies in a regional agreement but not globally? How can bilateral deals — even dozens of them — come close to matching the economic impact of agreeing to global free trade among 146 countries? Bilateral and regional deals can sometimes be a complement to the multilateral system, but they can never be a substitute. There is a bigger danger. By treating some countries preferentially, bilateral and regional deals exclude others — fragmenting global trade and distorting the world economy. Instead of liberalizing trade — and widening growth — they carve it up. Worse, they have a domino effect: bilateral deals inevitably beget more bilateral deals, as countries left outside are forced to seek their own preferential arrangements, or risk further marginalization. This is precisely what we see happening today. There are already over two hundred bilateral and regional agreements in existence, and each month we hear of a new or expanded deal. There is a basic contradiction in the assumption that bilateral approaches serve to strengthen the multilateral, rules-based system. Even when intended to spur free trade, they can ultimately risk undermining it. This is in no one's interest, least of all the United States. America led in the creation of the multilateral system after 1945 precisely to avoid a return to hostile blocs — blocs that had done so much to fuel interwar instability and conflict. America's vision, in the words of Cordell Hull, was that “enduring peace and the welfare of nations was indissolubly connected with the friendliness, fairness and freedom of world trade”. Trade would bind nations together, making another war unthinkable. Non-discriminatory rules would prevent a return to preferential deals and closed alliances. A network of multilateral initiatives and organizations — the Marshal Plan, the IMF, the World Bank, and the GATT, now the WTO — would provide the institutional bedrock for the international rule of law, not power. Underpinning all this was the idea that freedom — free trade, free democracies, the free exchange of ideas — was essential to peace and prosperity, a more just world. It is a vision that has emerged pre-eminent a half century later. Trade has expanded twenty-fold since 1950. Millions in Asia, Latin America, and Africa are being lifted out of poverty, and millions more have new hope for the future. All the great powers — the US, Europe, Japan, India, China and soon Russia — are part of a rules-based multilateral trading system, greatly increasing the chances for world prosperity and peace. There is a growing realization that — in our interdependent world — sovereignty is constrained, not by multilateral rules, but by the absence of rules.

### 2

#### The 1AC is a construction of false threats lingering on the horizon – that makes extinction inevitable

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Last August, the Republican presidential contender Mitt Romney performed what has become a quadrennial rite of passage in American presidential politics: he delivered a speech to the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars. His message was rooted in another grand American tradition: hyping foreign threatsto the United States. It is “wishful thinking,” Romney declared, “that the world is becoming a safer place. The opposite is true. Consider simply thejihadists, a near-nuclear Iran, a turbulent Middle East, an unstable Pakistan, a delusional North Korea, an assertive Russia, and an emerging global power called China. No, the world is not becoming safer.”  Not long after, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta echoed Romney’s statement. In a lecture last October, Panetta warned of threats arising “from terrorism to nuclear proliferation; from rogue states to cyber attacks; from revolutions in the Middle East, to economic crisis in Europe, tothe rise of new powers such as China and India. All of these changes represent security, geopolitical, economic, and demographic shifts in the international order that make the world more unpredictable, more volatile and, yes, more dangerous.” General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, concurred in a recent speech, arguing that “the number and kinds of threats we face have increased significantly.” And U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reinforced the point by claiming that America resides today in a “very complex, dangerous world.”  Within the foreign policy elite, there exists a pervasive belief that the post–Cold War world is a treacherous place, full of great uncertainty and grave risks. A 2009 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press found that 69 percent of members of the Council on Foreign Relations believed that for the United States at that moment, the world was either as dangerous as or more dangerous than it was during the Cold War. Similarly, in 2008, the Center for American Progress surveyed more than 100 foreign policy experts and found that 70 percent of them believed that the world was becoming more dangerous. Perhaps more than any other idea, this belief shapes debates on U.S. foreign policy and frames the public’s understanding of international affairs.   There is just one problem. It is simply wrong. The world that the United States inhabits today is a remarkably safe and secure place. It is a world with fewer violentconflicts and greater political freedom than at virtually any other point in human history. All over the world, people enjoy longer life expectancy and greater economic opportunity than ever before. The United States faces no plausible existentialthreats, no great-power rival, and no near-term competition for the role of global hegemon. The U.S. military is the world’s most powerful, and even in the middle of a sustained downturn, the U.S. economy remains among one of the world’s most vibrant and adaptive. Although the United States faces a host of international challenges, they pose little risk to the overwhelming majority of American citizens and can be managed with existing diplomatic, economic, and, to a much lesser extent, military tools.   This reality is barely reflected in U.S. national security strategy or in American foreign policy debates. President Barack Obama’s most recent National Security Strategy aspires to “a world in which America is stronger, more secure, and is able to overcome our challenges while appealing to the aspirations of people around the world.” Yet that is basically the world that exists today.The United States is the world’s most powerful nation, unchallenged and secure. But the country’s political and policy elite seems unwilling to recognize this fact, much less integrate it into foreign policy and national security decision-making.  The disparity betweenforeignthreats and domesticthreat-mongering results froma confluence of factors. The most obvious and important is electoral politics. Hyping dangers serves the interests of both political parties. For Republicans, who have long benefited fromattacking Democrats for their alleged weakness in the face of foreign threats, there is little incentive to tone down the rhetoric; the notion of a dangerous world plays to perhaps their greatest political advantage. For Democrats, who are fearful of being cast as feckless, acting and sounding tough is a shield against GOP attacks and an insurance policy in case a challenge to the United States materializes into a genuine threat. Warningsabout a dangerous world also benefit powerful bureaucraticinterests. The specter of looming dangers sustains andjustifies the massive budgets of the military and the intelligence agencies, along with the national security infrastructure that exists outside government -- defense contractors, lobbying groups, think tanks, and academic departments.   There is also a pernicious feedback loop at work. Because of the chronic exaggeration of the threats facing the United States,Washington overemphasizes military approaches to problems (including many that could best be solved by nonmilitary means). The militarization of foreign policy leads, in turn, to further dark warnings about the potentially harmful effects of any effort to rebalance U.S. national security spending or trim the massive military budget -- warnings that are inevitably bolstered by more threat exaggeration. Last fall, General Norton Schwartz, the U.S. Air Force chief of staff, said that defense cuts that would return military spending to its 2007 level would undermine the military’s “ability to protect the nation” and could create “dire consequences.” Along the same lines, Panetta warned that the same reductions would“invite aggression” from enemies. These are a puzzling statements given that the U.S. defense budget is larger than the next 14 countries’ defense budgets combined and that the United States still maintains weapons systems designed to fight an enemy that disappeared 20 years ago. Of course, threat inflation is not new. During the Cold War, although the United States faced genuine existential threats, American political leaders nevertheless hyped smaller threats or conflated them with larger ones. Today, there are no dangers to the United States remotely resembling those of the Cold War era, yet policymakers routinely talk in the alarmist terms once used to describe superpower conflict. Indeed, the mindset of the United States in the post-9/11 world was best (albeit crudely) captured by former Vice President Dick Cheney. While in office, Cheney promoted the idea that the United States must prepare for even the most remote threat as though it were certain to occur. The journalist Ron Suskind termed this belief “the one percent doctrine,” a reference to what Cheney called the “one percent chance that Pakistani scientists are helping al Qaeda build or develop a nuclear weapon.” According to Suskind, Cheney insisted that the United States must treat such a remote potential threat “as a certainty in terms of our response.”   Such hair-trigger responsiveness is rarely replicated outside the realm of national security, even when the governmentconfronts problems that cause Americans farmore harm than any foreign threat. According to an analysis by the budget expert Linda Bilmes and the economist Joseph Stiglitz, in the ten years since 9/11, the combined direct and indirect costs of the U.S. response to the murder of almost 3,000 of its citizens have totaled more than $3 trillion. A study by the Urban Institute, a nonpartisan think tank, estimated that during an overlapping period, from 2000 to 2006,137,000 Americans died prematurely because they lacked health insurance. Although the federal government maintains robust health insurance programs for older and poor Americans, its response to a national crisis in health care during that time paled in comparison to its response to the far less deadly terrorist attacks.  Rather than Cheney’s one percent doctrine, whatthe United States actuallyneedsisa 99 percent doctrine: a national security strategy based on the fact that the UnitedStates is a safe and well-protected country and grounded in the reality that the opportunities for furthering U.S. interests far exceed the threats to them. Fully comprehending the world as it is today is the best way to keep the United States secureand resistant to the overreactions that have defined its foreign policy for far too long.  BETTER THAN EVER  The United States, along with the rest of the world, currently faces a period of economic and political uncertainty. But consider four long-term global trends that underscore just how misguided the constant fear-mongering in U.S. politics is: the falling prevalence of violent conflict, the declining incidence of terrorism, the spread of political freedom and prosperity, and the global improvement in public health. In 1992, there were 53 armed conflicts raging in 39 countries around the world; in 2010, there were 30 armed conflicts in 25 countries. Of the latter, only four have resulted in at least 1,000 battle-related deaths and can therefore be classified as wars, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program: the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia, two of which were started by the United States.   Today, wars tend to be low-intensity conflicts that, on average, kill about 90 percent fewer people than did violent struggles in the 1950s. Indeed, the first decade of this century witnessed fewer deaths from war than any decade in the last century. Meanwhile, the world’s great powers have not fought a direct conflict in more than 60 years -- “the longest period of major power peace in centuries,” as the Human Security Report Project puts it. Nor is there much reason for the United States to fear such a war in the near future: no state currently has the capabilities or the inclination to confront the United States militarily.   Much of the fear that suffuses U.S. foreign policy stems from the trauma of 9/11. Yet although the tactic of terrorism remains a scourge in localized conflicts, between 2006 and 2010, the total number of terrorist attacks declined by almost 20 percent, and the number of deaths caused by terrorism fell by 35 percent, according to the U.S. State Department. In 2010, more than three-quarters of all victims of terrorism -- meaning deliberate, politically motivated violence by nonstate groups against noncombatant targets -- were injured or killed in the war zones of Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and Somalia. Of the 13,186 people killed by terrorist attacks in 2010, only 15, or 0.1 percent, were U.S. citizens. In most places today -- and especially in the United States -- the chances of dying from a terrorist attack or in a military conflict have fallen almost to zero.  As violence and war have abated, freedom and democratic governance have made great gains. According to Freedom House, there were 69 electoral democracies at the end of the Cold War; today, there are 117. And during that time, the number of autocracies declined from 62 to 48. To be sure, in the process of democratizing, states with weak political institutions can be more prone to near-term instability, civil wars, and interstate conflict. Nevertheless, over time, democracies tend to have healthier and better-educated citizens, almost never go to war with other democracies, and are less likely to fight nondemocracies.  Economic bonds among states are also accelerating, even in the face of a sustained global economic downturn. Today, 153 countries belong to the World Trade Organization and are bound by its dispute-resolution mechanisms. Thanks to lowered trade barriers, exports now make up more than 30 percent of gross world product, a proportion that has tripled in the past 40 years. The United States has seen its exports to the world’s fastest-growing economies increase by approximately 500 percent over the past decade. Currency flows have exploded as well, with $4 trillion moving around the world in foreign exchange markets every day. Remittances, an essential instrument for reducing poverty in developing countries, have more than tripled in the past decade, to more than $440 billion each year. Partly as a result of these trends, poverty is on the decline: in 1981, half the people living in the developing world survived on less than $1.25 a day; today, that figure is about one-sixth. Like democratization, economic development occasionally brings with it significant costs. In particular, economic liberalization can strain the social safety net that supports a society’s most vulnerable populations and can exacerbate inequalities. Still, from the perspective of the United States, increasing economic interdependence is a net positive because trade and foreign direct investment between countries generally correlate withlong-term economic growth and a reduced likelihood of war.   A final trend contributing to the relative security of the United States is the improvement in global health and well-being. People in virtually all countries, and certainly in the United States, are living longer and healthier lives. In 2010, the number of people who died from AIDS-related causes declined for the third year in a row. Tuberculosis rates continue to fall, as do the rates of polio and malaria. Child mortality has plummeted worldwide, thanks in part to expanded access to health care, sanitation, and vaccines. In 1970, the global child mortality rate (deaths of children under five per 1,000) was 141; in 2010, it was 57. In 1970, global average life expectancy was 59, and U.S. life expectancy was 70. Today, the global figure is just under 70, and the U.S. figure is 79. These vast improvements in health and well-being contribute to the global trend toward security and safety because countries with poor human development are more war-prone.  PHANTOM MENACE  None of this is meant to suggest that the United States faces no major challenges today. Rather, the point is that the problems confronting the country are manageable and pose minimal risks to the lives of the overwhelming majority of Americans. None of them -- separately or in combination -- justifies the alarmist rhetoric of policymakers and politicians or should lead to the conclusion that Americans live in a dangerous world.  Take terrorism. Since 9/11, no security threat has been hyped more. Considering the horrors of that day, that is not surprising. But the result has been a level of fear that is completely out of proportion to both the capabilities of terrorist organizations and the United States’ vulnerability. On 9/11, al Qaeda got tragically lucky. Since then, the United States has been preparing for the one percent chance (and likely even less) that it might get lucky again. But al Qaeda lost its safe haven after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and further military, diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement efforts have decimated the organization, which has essentially lost whatever ability it once had to seriously threaten the United States.   According to U.S. officials, al Qaeda’s leadership has been reduced to two top lieutenants: Ayman al-Zawahiri and his second-in-command, Abu Yahya al-Libi. Panetta has even said that the defeat of al Qaeda is “within reach.” The near collapse of the original al Qaeda organization is one reason why, in the decade since 9/11, the U.S. homeland has not suffered any large-scale terrorist assaults. All subsequent attempts have failed or been thwarted, owing in part to the incompetence of their perpetrators. Although there are undoubtedly still some terrorists who wish to kill Americans, their dreams will likely continue to be frustrated by their own limitations and by the intelligence and law enforcement agencies of the United States and its allies.  As the threat from transnational terrorist groups dwindles, the United States also faces few risks from other states. China is the most obvious potential rival to the United States, and there is little doubt that China’s rise will pose a challenge to U.S. economic interests. Moreover, there is an unresolved debate among Chinese political and military leaders about China’s proper global role, and the lack of transparency from China’s senior leadership about its long-term foreign policy objectives is a cause for concern. However, the present security threat to the U.S. mainland is practically nonexistent and will remain so. Even as China tries to modernize its military, its defense spending is still approximately one-ninth that of the United States. In 2012, the Pentagon will spend roughly as much on military research and development alone as China will spend on its entire military.   While China clumsily flexes its muscles in the Far East by threatening to deny access to disputed maritime resources, a recent Pentagon report noted that China’s military ambitions remain dominated by “regional contingencies” and that the People’s Liberation Army has made little progress in developing capabilities that “extend global reach or power projection.” In the coming years, China will enlarge its regional role, but this growth will only threaten U.S. interests if Washington attempts to dominate East Asia and fails to consider China’s legitimate regional interests. It is true that China’s neighbors sometimes fear that China will not resolve its disputes peacefully, but this has compelled Asian countries to cooperate with the United States, maintaining bilateral alliances that together form a strong security architecture and limit China’s room to maneuver.  The strongest arguments made by those warning of Chinese influence revolve around economic policy. The list of complaints includes a host of Chinese policies, from intellectual property theft and currency manipulation to economic espionage and domestic subsidies. Yet none of those is likely to lead to direct conflict with the United States beyond the competition inherent in international trade, which does not produce zero-sum outcomes and is constrained by dispute-resolution mechanisms, such as those of the World Trade Organization. If anything, China’s export-driven economic strategy, along with its large reserves of U.S. Treasury bonds, suggests that Beijing will continue to prefer a strong United States to a weak one.   NUCLEAR FEAR  It is a matter of faith among many American politicians that Iran is the greatest danger now facing the country. But if that is true, then the United States can breathe easy: Iran is a weak military power. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Iran’s “military forces have almost no modern armor, artillery, aircraft or major combat ships, and UN sanctions will likely obstruct the purchase of high-technology weapons for the foreseeable future.”   Tehran’s stated intention to project its interests regionally through military or paramilitary forces has made Iran its own worst enemy. Iran’s neighbors are choosing to balance against the Islamic Republic rather than fall in line behind its leadership. In 2006, Iran’s favorability rating in Arab countries stood at nearly 80 percent; today, it is under 30 percent. Like China’s neighbors in East Asia, the Gulf states have responded to Iran’s belligerence by participating in an emerging regional security arrangement with the United States, which includes advanced conventional weapons sales, missile defenses, intelligence sharing, and joint military exercises, all of which have further isolated Iran.  Of course, the gravest concerns about Iran focus on its nuclear activities. Those fears have led to some of the most egregiously alarmist rhetoric: at a Republican national security debate in November, Romney claimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon is “the greatest threat the world faces.” But it remains unclear whether Tehran has even decided to pursue a bomb or has merely decided to develop a turnkey capability. Either way, Iran’s leaders have been sufficiently warned that the United States would respond with overwhelming force to the use or transfer of nuclear weapons. Although a nuclear Iran would be troubling to the region, the United States and its allies would be able to contain Tehran and deter its aggression -- and the threat to the U.S. homeland would continue to be minimal.  Overblown fears of a nuclear Iran are part of a more generalized American anxiety about the continued potential of nuclear attacks. Obama’s National Security Strategy claims that “the American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon.” According to the document, “international peace and security is threatened by proliferation that could lead to a nuclear exchange. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk of a nuclear attack has increased.”   If the context is a state-against-state nuclear conflict, the latter assertion is patently false. The demise of the Soviet Union ended the greatest potential for international nuclear conflict. China, with only 72 intercontinental nuclear missiles, is eminently deterrable and not a credible nuclear threat; it has no answer for the United States’ second-strike capability and the more than 2,000 nuclear weapons with which the United States could strike China.   In the past decade, Cheney and other one-percenters have frequently warned of the danger posed by loose nukes or uncontrolled fissile material. In fact, the threat of a nuclear device ending up in the hands of a terrorist group has diminished markedly since the early 1990s, when the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal was dispersed across all of Russia’s 11 time zones, all 15 former Soviet republics, and much of eastern Europe. Since then, cooperative U.S.-Russian efforts have resulted in the substantial consolidation of those weapons at far fewer sites and in comprehensive security upgrades at almost all the facilities that still possess nuclear material or warheads, making the possibility of theft or diversion unlikely. Moreover, the lessons learned from securing Russia’s nuclear arsenal are now being applied in other countries, under the framework of Obama’s April 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, which produced a global plan to secure all nuclear materials within four years. Since then, participants in the plan, including Chile, Mexico, Ukraine, and Vietnam, have fulfilled more than 70 percent of the commitments they made at the summit.  Pakistan represents another potential source of loose nukes. The United States’ military strategy in Afghanistan, with its reliance on drone strikes and cross-border raids, has actually contributed to instability in Pakistan, worsened U.S. relations with Islamabad, and potentially increased the possibility of a weapon falling into the wrong hands. Indeed, Pakistani fears of a U.S. raid on its nuclear arsenal have reportedly led Islamabad to disperse its weapons to multiple sites, transporting them in unsecured civilian vehicles. But even in Pakistan, the chances of a terrorist organization procuring a nuclear weapon are infinitesimally small. The U.S. Department of Energy has provided assistance to improve the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, and successive senior U.S. government officials have repeated what former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said in January 2010: that the United States is “very comfortable with the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons.”  A more recent bogeyman in national security debates is the threat of so-called cyberwar. Policymakers and pundits have been warning for more than a decade about an imminent “cyber–Pearl Harbor” or “cyber-9/11.” In June 2011, then Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn said that “bits and bytes can be as threatening as bullets and bombs.” And in September 2011, Admiral Mike Mullen, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, described cyberattacks as an “existential” threat that “actually can bring us to our knees.”   Although the potential vulnerability of private businesses and government agencies to cyberattacks has increased, the alleged threat of cyberwarfare crumbles under scrutiny. No cyberattack has resulted in the loss of a single U.S. citizen’s life. Reports of “kinetic-like” cyberattacks, such as one on an Illinois water plant and a North Korean attack on U.S. government servers, have proved baseless. Pentagon networks are attacked thousands of times a day by individuals and foreign intelligence agencies; so, too, are servers in the private sector. But the vast majority of these attacks fail wherever adequate safeguards have been put in place. Certainly, none is even vaguely comparable to Pearl Harbor or 9/11, and most can be offset by commonsense prevention and mitigation efforts.   A NEW APPROACH  Defenders of the status quo might contend that chronic threat inflation and an overmilitarized foreign policy have not prevented the United States from preserving a high degree of safety and security and therefore are not pressing problems. Others might argue that although the world might not be dangerous now, it could quickly become so if the United States grows too sanguine about global risks and reduces its military strength. Both positions underestimate the costs and risks of the status quo and overestimate the need for the United States to rely on an aggressive military posture driven by outsized fears.   Since the end of the Cold War, most improvements in U.S. security have not depended primarily on the country’s massive military, nor have they resulted from the constantly expanding definition of U.S. national security interests. The United States deserves praise for promoting greater international economic interdependence and open markets and, along with a host of international and regional organizations and private actors, more limited credit for improving global public health and assisting in the development of democratic governance. But although U.S. military strength has occasionally contributed to creating a conducive environment for positive change, those improvements were achieved mostly through the work of civilian agencies and nongovernmental actors in the private and nonprofit sectors. The record of an overgrown post–Cold War U.S. military is far more mixed. Although some U.S.-led military efforts, such as the NATO intervention in the Balkans, have contributed to safer regional environments, the U.S.-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have weakened regional and global security, leading to hundreds of thousands of casualties and refugee crises (according to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 45 percent of all refugees today are fleeing the violence provoked by those two wars). Indeed, overreactions to perceived security threats, mainly from terrorism, have done significant damage to U.S. interests and threaten to weaken the global norms and institutions that helped create and sustain the current era of peace and security. None of this is to suggest that the United States should stop playing a global role; rather, it should play a different role, one that emphasizes soft power over hard power and inexpensive diplomacy and development assistance over expensive military buildups.  Indeed, the most lamentable cost of unceasingthreat exaggeration and a focus on military force is that the main globalchallenges facing the United States todayare poorly resourced and given far less attention than “sexier” problems, such as war and terrorism. These include climate change, pandemic diseases, global economic instability, and transnational criminal networks -- all of which could serve as catalysts to severe and direct challenges to U.S. security interests. But these concerns are less visceral than alleged threats from terrorism and rogue nuclear states. They require long-term planning and occasionally painful solutions, and they are not constantly hyped by well-financed interest groups. As a result, they are given short shrift in national security discourse and policymaking.

#### Symptom focus makes all aff impacts inevitable—self reflexivity is a prerequisite to solvency.

Ahmed 11—Nafeez Mosaddeq Ahmed is an international security analyst. He is Executive Director at the Institute for Policy Research and Development, and Associate Tutor at the Department of IR, University of Sussex, where he obtained his DPhil. [“The international relations of crisis and the crisis of international relations: from the securitisation of scarcity to the militarisation of society,” *Global Change, Peace & Security*, Volume 23, Issue 3, 2011, Taylor and Francis Online]

2.4 The socio-historical evacuation of the political ecology of power¶ Global ecological, economic and energy crises thus expose a core contradiction at the heart of modernity – that the material progress delivered by scientific reason in the service of unlimited economic growth is destroying the very social and environmental conditions of modernity's very existence. This stark contradiction between official government recognition of the potentially devastating security implications of resource scarcity and the continued abject failure of government action to mitigate these security implications represents a fundamental lacuna that has been largely overlooked in IR theory and policy analysis. It reveals an analytical framework that has focused almost exclusively on potential symptoms of scarcity. But a truly complete picture of the international relations of resource scarcity would include not only a map of projected impacts, but would also seek to grasp their causes by confronting how the present structure of the international system itself has contributed to the acceleration of scarcity, while inhibiting effective national and international responses.¶ It could be suggested that the present risk-oriented preoccupation with symptoms is itself symptomatic of IR's insufficient self-reflection on its own role in this problem. Despite the normative emphasis on ensuring national and international security, the literature's overwhelming preoccupation with gauging the multiplicity of ways in which ecological, energy and economic crises might challenge security in coming decades provides very little opening in either theory or policy to develop more effective strategies to mitigate or prevent these heightened security challenges. On the contrary, for the most part, these approaches tend to highlight the necessity to maximise national political–military and international regimes' powers so that states might be able to respond more robustly in the event that new threats like resource wars and state failure do emerge. But the futility of this trajectory is obvious – a preoccupation with ‘security’ ends up becoming an unwitting accomplice in the intensification of insecurity.

#### Vote negative to de-securitize the political

### 3

#### Text: The United States federal government should pass H.R. 2216, the NADBank Enhancement Act.

#### NADBank restrictions prevent investment – counter plan solves.

Balido, 11 (Nelson, President of the Border Trade Alliance, “Bill to expand NADBank projects holds potential to make big impact for border,” August 29, <http://www.thebta.org/btanews/bill-to-expand-nadbank-projects-holds-potential-to-make-big-impact-for-border.html>)

Over the past sixteen years of operation, the NADBank has been vitally important to improving basic services in the border region by financing numerous water, wastewater, solid waste and street paving projects, among others. To date, NADBank has provided approximately $1.24 billion in loans and grants to support 149 infrastructure projects in the border region, which represents a total investment of $3.26 billion and will benefit more than 12.8 million residents of the region.¶ One particularly notable accomplishment is the significant improvement in wastewater treatment coverage on the Mexican side of the border. In 1995, it was estimated that 27 percent of wastewater generated in border communities was being treated. According to Mexico’s National Water Commission (CONAGUA), wastewater treatment coverage has now reached approximately 85 percent. This dramatic improvement is in large part due to the work of NADBank.¶ The bank remains limited, however, in the projects it can finance. Its charter permits the bank only to get involved in projects deemed to have a significant positive environmental impact. There have been cases where the NADBank has taken interest in projects involving international ports of entry that would benefit an area’s economy and create new jobs. Yet the bank has been unable to deliver financing to such projects, over the objections of its board of directors, for not demonstrating a sufficient environmental benefit to merit NADBank financing.¶ Rep. Rubén Hinojosa (D-Texas) has introduced a bill, H.R. 2216, the NADBank Enhancement Act of 2011, which would broaden the scope of projects where the bank could provide financing. This would include projects that promote trade and commerce between the U.S. and Mexico, including port of entry modernization and construction projects.¶ Perhaps the best thing about the bill is that it doesn’t add a dime to the federal deficit or debt. Rather, the bill will help ensure NADBank’s existing capital is more fully utilized for the benefit of the U.S.-Mexico border region, and ultimately for the benefit of both the U.S. and Mexico.¶ The NADBank isn’t going to solve the nation’s infrastructure woes. NADBank is and will continue to be a bank focused on the border region. But the potential is there for the bank to move beyond its traditional scope of financing U.S.-Mexico border region water quality and wastewater projects and get involved in financing additional border area infrastructure projects that could improve the area’s quality of life and provide a needed boost to the region’s economy.

### 4

#### Economic engagement is a conditional QPQ

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

* The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.
* The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.
* The tactics of economic engagementshouldpromote China’s economic integration through negotiationsontrade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.
* The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in FareedZakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

#### “Increase” means a net increase

Rogers 5 (Judge – New York, et al., Petitioners v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Respondent, NSR Manufacturers Roundtable, et al., Intervenors, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 12378, \*\*; 60 ERC (BNA) 1791, 6/24, Lexis)

[\*\*48]  Statutory Interpretation. [HN16](http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?_m=1fe428155fdfc9074f3623f0dae9d78a&docnum=14&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=0ebd338d6a7793de8561db53b915effd&focBudTerms=term%20increase&focBudSel=all#clscc16)While the CAA defines a "modification" as any physical or operational change that "increases" emissions, it is silent on how to calculate such "increases" in emissions. [42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(4)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=4&_butStat=0&_butNum=103&_butInline=1&_butinfo=42%20U.S.C.%207411&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=1f89a0e47b1996a5400e8d865d8da08a). According to government petitioners, the lack of a statutory definition does not render the term "increases" ambiguous, but merely compels the court to give the term its "ordinary meaning." See [Engine Mfrs.Ass'nv.S.Coast AirQualityMgmt.Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 124 S. Ct. 1756, 1761, 158 L. Ed. 2d 529(2004)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=104&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b541%20U.S.%20246%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=48f016ea3eabfdb898b67b348b11662c); [Bluewater Network, 370 F.3d at 13](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=105&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b370%20F.3d%201%2cat%2013%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=78fdfe9d48c7b91d7659b90c0198707e); [Am. Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Glickman, 342 U.S. App. D.C. 7, 215 F.3d 7, 10 [\*23]  (D.C. Cir. 2000)](http://www.lexis.com/research/buttonTFLink?_m=8541fbf7a7f5554ca588059b132acd17&_xfercite=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b367%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%203%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_butType=3&_butStat=2&_butNum=106&_butInline=1&_butinfo=%3ccite%20cc%3d%22USA%22%3e%3c%21%5bCDATA%5b342%20U.S.%20App.%20D.C.%207%5d%5d%3e%3c%2fcite%3e&_fmtstr=FULL&docnum=14&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkAW&_md5=fb18ff0b92931ac00621d88dae997e67). Relying on two "real world" analogies, government petitioners contend that the ordinary meaning of "increases" requires the baseline to be calculated from a period immediately preceding the change. They maintain, for example, that in determining whether a high-pressure weather system "increases" the local temperature, the relevant baseline is the temperature immediately preceding the arrival of the weather system, not the temperature five or ten years ago. Similarly,  [\*\*49]  in determining whether a new engine "increases" the value of a car, the relevant baseline is the value of the car immediately preceding the replacement of the engine, not the value of the car five or ten years ago when the engine was in perfect condition.

Vote negative

a) Limits – policies the embargo means there’s a near-infinite range of “one exception” affs

b) Ground – unconditional engagement denies us “say no” and backlash arguments which are a crucial part of the engagement debate

### Econ

#### No chance of war from economic decline---best and most recent data

Daniel W. Drezner 12, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, October 2012, “The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System Worked,” <http://www.globaleconomicgovernance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf>

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasn’t barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict, there were genuine concerns that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. ¶ The aggregate data suggests otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a “Global Peace Index” annually since 2007. A key conclusion they draw from the 2012 report is that “The average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007.”38 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis – as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, “the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.”40¶ None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern. Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard “V”-shaped recovery was unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of “contained depression.”41 The key word is “contained,” however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the 2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: “that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since World War II – and not even worse – must be regarded as fortunate.”42

**investment in infrastructure is manipulated by project managers who cook the data to win project approval – exaggerates AFF benefits and causes massive cost overruns**

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This situation may need some explication, because it may sound to many like an unlikely state of affairs. After all, it may be agreed that project managers and other professionals involved in major infrastructure provision ought to be interested in being accurate and unbiased in their work. It is even stated in the Project Management Institute (PMI)’s Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct (PMI, 2006, pp. 4, 5) that project managers should ‘provide accurate information in a timely manner’ and they must ‘not engage in or condone behaviour that is designed to deceive others’. Economists, engineers, planners, and others involved in major infrastructure provision have similar codes of conduct. But there is a dark side to their work, which is remarkably underexplored in the literature (Flyvbjerg, 1996). On the dark side, project managers and planners ‘lie with numbers’. as Wachs (1989) has aptly put it. They are busy not with getting forecasts and business cases right and following the PMI Code of Ethics but with getting projects funded and built. And accurate forecasts are often not an effective means for achieving this objective. Indeed, accurate forecasts may be counterproductive, whereas biased forecasts may be effective in competing for funds and securing the go-ahead for a project. ‘The most effective planner,’ says Wachs (1989, p. 477), ‘is sometimes the one who can cloak advocacy in the guise of scientiﬁc or technical rationality.’ Such advocacy would stand in direct opposition to PMI’s ruling that project managers should ‘make decisions and take actions based on the best interests of society’ (PMI, 2006, p. 2). Nevertheless, seemingly rational forecasts that underestimate costs and overestimate beneﬁts have long been an established formula for project approval as we saw above. Forecasting is here mainly another kind of rent-seeking behaviour, resulting in a make-believe world of misrepresentation which makes it extremely difﬁcult to decide which projects deserve undertaking and which do not. The consequence is, as even one of the industry’s own organs, the Oxford-based Major Projects Association, acknowledges, that **too many projects proceed that should not**. One might add that many projects do not proceed that probably should, had they not lost out to projects with ‘better’ misrepresentation (Flyvbjerg et al., 2002). In this situation, the question is not so much what project managers can do to reduce inaccuracy and risk in forecasting, but what others can do to impose on project managers the checks and balances that would give managers the incentive to stop producing biased forecasts and begin to work according to their Code of Ethics. The challenge is to change the power relations that govern forecasting and project development. Better forecasting techniques and appeals to ethics will not do here; organizational change with a **focus on transparency and accountability is necessary**. As argued in Flyvbjerg et al. (2003), two basic types of accountability deﬁne liberal democracies: (i) public-sector accountability through transparency and public control; and (ii) private-sector accountability via competition and the market mechanism. Both types of accountability may be effective tools to curb misrepresentation in project management and to promote a culture which acknowledges and deals effectively with risk, especially where large amounts of taxpayers’ money are at stake and for projects with signiﬁcant social and environmental impacts, as is common with major infrastructure projects.

**Data cooking creates economic disasters – the worst projects are approved, and necessary infrastructure loses out – this turns the case**

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In sum, the UK study shows that strong interests and strong incentives exist at the project-approval stage to present projects as favourably as possible—that is, with beneﬁts emphasized and costs and risks de-emphasized. Local authorities, local developers and land owners, local labour unions, local politicians, local ofﬁcials, local MPs, and consultants all stand to beneﬁt from a project that looks favourable on paper and they have little incentive actively to avoid bias in estimates of beneﬁts, costs, and risks. National bodies, such as certain parts of the Department for Transport and the Ministry of Finance who fund and oversee projects, may have an interest in more realistic appraisals, but so far they have had little success in achieving such realism, although the situation may be changing with the initiatives to curb bias set out in HM Treasury (2003) and UK Department for Transport (2006). Wachs (1986, 1990) found similar results for transit planning in the USA. Taken together, the UK and US studies both account well for existing data on cost underestimation and beneﬁt overestimation. Both studies falsify the notion that in situations with high political and organizational pressure the underestimation of costs and overestimation of beneﬁts is caused by non-intentional technical error or optimism bias. Both studies support the view that in such situations promoters and forecasters intentionally use the following formula in order to secure approval and funding for their projects: underestimated costs + overestimated beneﬁts = funding Using this formula, and thus ‘showing the project at its best’ as one interviewee said above, results in an inverted Darwinism, i.e the **survival of the unﬁttest**. It is not the best projects that get implemented, but the projects that look best on paper. And the projects that look best on paper are the projects with the largest cost underestimates and beneﬁt overestimates, other things being equal. But the larger the cost underestimate on paper, the greater the cost overrun in practice. And the larger the overestimate of beneﬁts, the greater the beneﬁt shortfall. Therefore the projects that have been made to look best on paper in this manner become the worst, or unﬁttest, projects in reality, in the sense that they are the very projects that will encounter most problems during construction and operations in terms of the largest cost overruns, beneﬁt shortfalls, and risks of non-viability. They have been designed like that, as **disasters waiting to happen**.

**No impact to hegemonic decline – their studies are wrong**

**MacDonald, 11** - Assistant Professor of Political Science at Williams College (Paul K, Spring 2011, "Graceful Decline?: The Surprising Success of Great Power Retrenchment", International Security, Vol. 35, No. 4, UTD McDermitt Library, KONTOPOULOS)

How do great powers respond to acute decline? The erosion of the relative power of the United States has scholars and policymakers reexamining this question. **The** central **issue is whether** **prompt retrenchment** **is** **desirable** or probable. Some **pessimists counsel** that **retrenchment is** a **dangerous** policy, because it shows weakness and invites attack. Robert **Kagan**, for example, **warns, "A reduction** in defense spending . . . **would unnerve** American **allies and undercut** efforts to gain greater **cooperation**. There is already a sense around the world, fed by irresponsible pundits here at home, that the United States is in terminal decline. Many fear that the economic crisis will cause the United States to pull back from overseas commitments. The announcement of a defense cutback would be taken by the world as evidence that the American retreat has begun."1 Robert **Kaplan** likewise **argues**, "Husbanding our power in an effort to slow America's decline in a post-Iraq and post-Afghanistan world would mean avoiding debilitating land entanglements and focusing instead on **being more of an offshore balancer**. . . . While this may be in America's interest, the very signaling of such an aloof intention **may encourage regional bullies**. . . . [L]essening our engagement with the world would have devastating consequences for humanity. The disruptions we witness today are but a taste of what is to come should our country flinch from its international responsibilities."2 The consequences of these views are clear: retrenchment should be avoided and forward defenses maintained into the indefinite future.3 Other observers advocate retrenchment policies, but they are pessimistic [End Page 7] about their prospects.4 Christopher Layne, for instance, predicts, "Even as the globe is being turned upside down by material factors, the foreign policies of individual states are shaped by the ideas leaders hold about their own nations' identity and place in world politics. More than most, America's foreign policy is the product of such ideas, and U.S. foreign-policy elites have constructed their own myths of empire to justify the United States' hegemonic role."5 Stephen Walt likewise advocates greater restraint in U.S. grand strategy, but cautions, "The United States . . . remains a remarkably immature great power, one whose rhetoric is frequently at odds with its conduct and one that tends to treat the management of foreign affairs largely as an adjunct to domestic politics. . . . [S]eemingly secure behind its nuclear deterrent and oceanic moats, and possessing unmatched economic and military power, the United States allowed its foreign policy to be distorted by partisan sniping, hijacked by foreign lobbyists and narrow domestic special interests, blinded by lofty but unrealistic rhetoric, and held hostage by irresponsible and xenophobic members of Congress."6 Although retrenchment is a preferable policy, these arguments suggest that great powers often cling to unprofitable foreign commitments for parochial reasons of national culture or domestic politics.7 **These arguments have** **grim implications for** contemporary **international politics**. With the rise of new powers, such as China, the international pecking order will be in increasing flux in the coming decades.8 Yet, **if the pessimists are correct**, **politicians and interests groups in the U**nited **S**tates **will be** **unwilling or unable to realign resources with overseas commitments**. **Perceptions of weakness and** **declining U.S. credibility** **will encourage policymakers to** **hold on to burdensome overseas commitments**, **despite their high costs** in blood and treasure.9 **Policymakers** in Washington **will** **struggle to retire** **from profitless military engagements** and restrain ballooning current accounts and budget deficits.10 For some observers, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the ill-advised last gasps of a declining hegemon seeking to bolster its plummeting position.11 In this article, **we question the logic and evidence of the retrenchment pessimists**. To date **there has been** **neither a comprehensive study** **of great power retrenchment** **nor a study that lays out the case** for retrenchment **as a practical or probable policy**. **This article fills these gaps by** **systematically examining the relationship between acute relative decline and the responses of great powers**. We examine eighteen cases of acute relative decline since 1870 and advance three main arguments. First, **we challenge the** retrenchment pessimists' **claim that** **domestic or international constraints** **inhibit the ability of declining great powers to retrench**. In fact, **when states fall in the hierarchy of great powers**, **peaceful retrenchment is the most common response**, **even over short time spans**. Based on the empirical record, we find that great powers retrenched in no less than eleven and no more than fifteen of the eighteen cases, a range of 61-83 percent. **When international conditions demand it, states renounce risky ties, increase reliance on allies** or adversaries, **draw down** their military **obligations, and impose adjustments on domestic populations**. Second, we find that the magnitude of relative decline helps explain the extent of great power retrenchment. Following the dictates of neorealist theory, **great powers retrench for the same reason they expand**: the rigors of **great power politics compel them** to do so.12 Retrenchment is by no means easy, but [End Page 9] necessity is the mother of invention, and **declining great powers face** **powerful incentives to contract their interests in a** **prompt and proportionate manner.** Knowing only a state's rate of relative economic decline explains its corresponding degree of retrenchment in as much as 61 percent of the cases we examined. Third, we argue that the rate of decline helps explain what forms great power retrenchment will take. How fast great powers fall contributes to whether these retrenching states will internally reform, seek new allies or rely more heavily on old ones, and make diplomatic overtures to enemies. Further, our analysis suggests that **great powers facing acute decline are** **less likely to initiate or escalate militarized interstate disputes**. **Faced with diminishing resources**, **great powers** **moderate their foreign policy ambitions** **and offer concessions in areas of lesser strategic value**. **Contrary to the pessimistic conclusions** **of critics,** **retrenchment neither requires aggression nor invites predation**. **Great powers** are able to **rebalance their commitments through compromise, rather than conflict**. In these ways, states respond to penury the same way they do to plenty: they seek to adopt policies that maximize security given available means. Far from being a hazardous policy, **retrenchment can be successful**. **States that retrench** **often regain their position in the hierarchy of great powers**. Of the fifteen great powers that adopted retrenchment in response to acute relative decline, 40 percent managed to recover their ordinal rank. In contrast, none of the declining powers that failed to retrench recovered their relative position.

**Protectionism won’t spiral out of control – interdependence**

**Marshall**, **09** (Andrew – asia political risk correspondent, Assault on free trade a key political risk, Reuters, 1/21/2009, p. lexis)

PREVENTING DISASTER Despite the risks, many analysts argue that a wholesale retreat into protectionism can be averted, because globalization has brought benefits governments will not want to reverse. "Fears that the financial crisis is ushering in an era of intensive nationalism and protectionism are overwrought," said Control Risks in its outlook for 2009. "The financial crisis has ... demonstrated that the global economy remains deeply interconnected and dependent on forging compromises between domestic politics and international capital." Cheap imports from emerging markets have brought significant benefits to consumers and companies in the developed world. "This factor, combined with the entrenched nature of global supply chains, is likely to **limit** the political **tolerance for protectionism**, at least in the main developed-country markets and in emerging markets that are highly dependent on exports," the Economist Intelligence Unit said.

**Drug violence is declining – most recent ev**

**WSJ 6-28-13** (Wall Street Journal, “Mexico Sees Decline in Drug-Related Killings”, June 28th, 2013, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324328204578573760968965312.html)

Drug-related killings that turned parts of Mexico into the bloodiest spots on the globe appear to **have decreased** in recent months - a welcome trend in a nation exhausted by years of violence associated with organized crime, even if the reasons behind it are hard to pin down.¶ The bloodshed is still alarmingly high, as the northern border and even the Acapulco beach resort continue to suffer from cartel turf wars.¶ In his first six months in office, around 6,300 people died in killings seen as linked to organized crime. But that is a **drop of about 18%** compared with an estimated 7,700 in the previous six months.¶ A separate study by a nonprofit group, the Mexican Institute of Competitiveness, used all reported murders, not just those classified as organized crime-related. It then seasonally adjusted the murder rates - since summer months tend to see a spike - and came up with a less-pronounced drop of 6% to around 10,000 murders, compared with about 10,600 in the six months before Mr. Peña Nieto took office.¶ The study's lead author, Alejandro Hope, a former government intelligence official, said the seasonally adjusted decline seems to have flattened out in recent months, suggesting further gains may be hard to come by.¶ "**The situation is improving** at a very slow rate," said Mr. Hope. "My nightmare scenario is that we get used to 20,000 or 25,000 people getting killed every year."

### Warming

#### No impact to warming

**Goklany 11** - a science and technology policy analyst for the United States Department of the Interior (Indur M., “Misled on Climate Change: How the UN IPCC (and others) Exaggerate the Impacts of Global Warming” December 2011, <http://goklany.org/library/Reason%20CC%20and%20Development%202011.pdf>, PZ)

A third approach would be to fix the root cause of why developing countries are deemed to be most at-risk, namely, poverty. Sustained economic growth would, as is evident from the experience of developed countries, address virtually all problems of poverty, not just that portion exacerbated by global warming. It is far more certain that sustainable economic growth will provide greater benefits than emission reductions: while there is no doubt that poverty leads to disease and death, **there is substantial doubt regarding the reality and magnitude of the negative impact of global warming. This is especially true as assessments often ignore improvements in adaptive capacity.** Of these three approaches, human well-being in poorer countries is likely to be advanced most effectively by sustained economic development and least by emission reductions. In addition, because of the inertia of the climate system, economic development is likely to bear fruit faster than any emission reductions.These figures also indicate that the compound effect of economic development and technological change can result in quite dramatic improvements even over the relatively short period for which these figures were developed. Figure 5, for instance, covered 26 years. By contrast, **climate change impacts analyses frequently look 50 to 100 years into the future**. Over such long periods, the compounded effect could well be spectacular**. Longer term analyses of climate-sensitive indicators of human well-being show that the combination of** economic growth and technological change can, over decades, reduce negative impacts on human beings by an order of magnitude, that is, **a factor of ten, or more**. In some instances, **this combination has virtually eliminated such negative impacts.** But, **since impact assessments generally fail to fully account for increases in economic development and technological change, they substantially** overestimate future net damages from global warming. It may be argued that the high levels of economic development depicted in Figure 6 are unlikely. But if that’s the case, then economic growth used to drive the IPCC’s scenarios are equally unlikely, which necessarily means that the estimates of emissions, temperature increases, and impacts and damages of GW projected by the IPCC are also overestimates.B. Secular Technological Change **The second major reason why future adaptive capacity has been underestimated** (**and the impacts of global warming systematically overestimated) is that few impact studies consider secular technological change.** 25 **Most assume that no new technologies will come on line**, although some do assume greater adoption of existing technologies with higher GDP per capita and, much less frequently, a modest generic improvement in productivity. 26 Such an assumption may have been appropriate during the Medieval Warm Period, when the pace of technological change was slow, but nowadays technological change is fast (as indicated in Figures 1 through 5) and, arguably, accelerating. 27 It is unlikely that we will see a halt to technological change unless so-called precautionary policies are instituted that count the costs of technology but ignore its benefits, as some governments have already done for genetically modified crops and various pesticides. So how much of a difference in impact would consideration of both economic development and technological change have made? If impacts were to be estimated for five or so years into the future, ignoring changes in adaptive capacity between now and then probably would not be fatal because neither economic development nor technological change would likely advance substantially during that period. However, **the time horizon of climate change impact assessments is often on the order of 35–100 years or more.** The Fast Track Assessments use a base year of 1990 to estimate impacts for 2025, 2055 and 2085. **Over such periods one ought to expect substantial advances in adaptive capacity due to increases in economic development, technological change and human capital**. As already noted, retrospective assessments indicate that **over the span of a few decades, changes in economic development and technologies can substantially reduce, if not eliminate, adverse environmental impacts and improve human well-being, as measured by a variety of objective indicators.** 41 **Thus, not fully accounting for changes in the level of economic development and secular technological change would understate future adaptive capacity, which then could overstate impacts by one or more orders of magnitude** if the time horizon is several decades into the future. The assumption that there would be little or no improved or new technologies that would become available between 1990 and 2100 (or 2200), as assumed in most climate change impact assessments, is clearly naïve. In fact, a comparison of today’s world against the world of 1990 (the base year used in most impacts studies to date) shows that even during this brief 20-year span, this assumption is invalid for many, if not most, human enterprises. Since 1990, for example, the portion of the developing world’s population living in absolute poverty declined from 42% to 25%, and in sub-Saharan Africa Internet users increased from 0 to 50 million, while cellular phone users went from 0 per 100 to 33 per 100.

**Even if all industrialized countries magically stopped emitting CO2, we’d still all die**

Ravi **Jain**, Dean and Professor of the School of Engineering and Computer Science, University of the Pacific, February **2008**

(“Global climate change: impacts and policy options” *Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy*, Vol. 10, No. 1, p. 1-5)

Clearly, since industrialized and developing countries share the same environmental commons (atmosphere, oceans, water resources, forests, and other natural resources) overuse of resources by any group is likely to affect the rest. Consequently, impacts on developing countries, representing a large segment of the world population, can be significant as well. As reported in the New York Times (December 16, 2007), if the established industrial countries turn off every power plant and car right now, the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, unless there are changes in policy in developing countries, could still reach 450 ppm by 2070: a level deemed unacceptably dangerous by many scientists. Thus, active involvement of emerging economies like China and India is crucial.

**The aff is way too small—every country in the world needs to cut emissions by 80% to solve**

David D. **Doniger et al.**, Policy Director of the Climate Center for the Natural Resources Defense Council, 11/03/**2006**

(David D. Doniger, Antonia V. Herzog, and Daniel A. Lashof, “An Ambitious, Centrist Approach to Global Warming Legislation” *Science*, Vol. 314, No.5800, p. 764-5)

There is growing concern that global warming of more than 2°C from pre-industrial levels could have dangerous climatic consequences (1, 2). It is estimated that, to avoid exceeding this 2° target, heat-trapping gas and aerosol concentrations need to be stabilized so that their net radiative effect is less than that of 450 parts per million (ppm) CO2 (3). This could be achieved if the United States and other industrial nations cut current emissions by 60 to 80% by 2050, and if developing countries limit emissions growth and impose similar reductions later in the century.